テクニカルレポート

ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー

text

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2009, 09-04-Rev.

Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market

Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

英語

text

2009-03

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0904R.pdf

* Revised: [09-04, 2009]

In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options whentheir marital condition becomes bad. The voice option can be interpreted as a spouse se¤ort or investment in the household to resolve his/her dissatisfaction and improve themarital condition. If a spouse hopes to divorce, he/she chooses the exit option. If a spousedoes not hope to express his/her opinion and divorce, he/she chooses the stay option. Wefocus on the role of exit and voice in a marriage and investigate the e¤ects of a divorcelaw that is based on fault or no-fault on divorce rates. Our study shows that divorce ratestend to be too high under a unilateral divorce law in the non-transferable utility case. Onthe other hand, mutual-consent divorce law generates multiple equilibria, and divorce ratesare then ine¢ cient even in the transferable utility case. In this multiple equilibrium case,divorce rates are determined by social factors, such as culture, norm, and religion.

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Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market

Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

英語

2009-03

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

09-04-Rev.

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13281

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0904R.pdf