Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver

Ishida, Junichiro; Shimizu, Takashi

アクセス数:209件（2025-01-25 01:45 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13305

論文情報

タイトル	Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver
著者	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
著者	NRID 1000080323468 1000080323468 著者名 Shimizu, Takashi
キーワード等	Cheap talk
	Informed receiver
	Information gap
	Preference congruence
内容	ISER discussion paper
内容	June 2009. Revised June 2015
抄録	This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver’s prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the extent of communication is severely limited as the receiver becomes more informed. Moreover, in a simple example with two signals, we show that no information can be conveyed via cheap talk for an arbitrarily small degree of preference incongruence. This result draws sharp contrast to the case with an uninformed receiver which always yields a fully separating equilibrium as long as the preferences are sufficiently congruent.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	746
ページ	1-15
刊行年月	2015-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13305
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0746R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2015-06

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2015, 746, p. 1-15
DC.title	Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver
DC.creator	Ishida, Junichiro
DC.creator	Shimizu, Takashi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2015-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0746R.pdf
DC.subject	Cheap talk
	Informed receiver
	Information gap
	Preference congruence
DC.description	ISER discussion paper
DC.description	June 2009. Revised June 2015
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver’s prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the extent of communication is severely limited as the receiver becomes more informed. Moreover, in a simple example with two signals, we show that no information can be conveyed via cheap talk for an arbitrarily small degree of preference incongruence. This result draws sharp contrast to the case with an uninformed receiver which always yields a fully separating equilibrium as long as the preferences are sufficiently congruent.
DC.format	13305
citation_title	Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver
citation_author	Ishida, Junichiro
citation_author	Shimizu, Takashi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2015-06
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	746
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	15
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13305
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0746R.pdf

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