Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy

Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo

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論文情報

タイトル	Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy
著者	Arawatari, Ryo Arawatari, Ryo
著者	Ono, Tetsuo Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等	Government debt
	Borrowing constraints
	Voting
	Structure-induced equilibrium
	Income inequality
抄録	We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agentsare borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributiveexpenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degreeof capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends-against-the-middle equilibriumwhere the constrained low-income and the unconstrained high-income agentsfavor low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agentsform a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of governmentdebt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of incomedistribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
	* Revised: [11-02, 2011]
	* Revised: [11-02-Rev., 2011]
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
更新日付	2011-09
更新日付	2012-05
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	11-02-Rev.2
刊行年月	2012-05
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13447
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1102R2.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.11-02-Rev.2
DC.title	Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy
DC.creator	Arawatari, Ryo
DC.creator	Ono, Tetsuo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2012-05
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13447
DC.subject	Government debt
	Borrowing constraints
	Voting
	Structure-induced equilibrium
	Income inequality
DCTERMS.abstract	We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agentsare borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributiveexpenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degreeof capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends-against-the-middle equilibriumwhere the constrained low-income and the unconstrained high-income agentsfavor low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agentsform a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of governmentdebt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of incomedistribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
	* Revised: [11-02, 2011]
	* Revised: [11-02-Rev., 2011]
citation_title	Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing-constrained Economy
citation_author	Arawatari, Ryo
citation_author	Ono, Tetsuo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2012-05
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	11-02-Rev.2
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13447
citation_keywords	Government debt
	Borrowing constraints
	Voting
	Structure-induced equilibrium
	Income inequality

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