Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting

Akai, Kenju; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2010, 740

アクセス数:244件（2025-03-14 06:51 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13586

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting
著者
NRID
1000020583214 1000020583214
著者名
Akai, Kenju
NRID
1000090252717 1000090252717
researchmap permalink
serizawa serizawa
Scopus Author ID
56234421600 56234421600
著者名
Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等
Corner-cutting
Public procurement
First-price auction
Experiment
内容
ISER discussion paper
May 2009, Revised August 2010
抄録
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that the winning bids and the winner's quality choices of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero, and it is a common knowledge. The experimental results are close to the theoretical results and indicate that firms with zero-initial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the winner's quality choices of the constructed buildings are considerably low.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
740
刊行年月
2010-08
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13586
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0740R.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日
2010-08