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2022-08-15
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このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください:http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
論文情報
タイトル
Fair Contracts
著者
Ishiguro, Shingo
Ishiguro, Shingo
キーワード等
Moral Hazard
Incentive Contracts
Fairness
抄録
In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimalcontracts, which we call “fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no–envyness. Theincentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficientcontracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No–envyness isequity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of othersin the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension betweenincentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple featurethat risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costlyaction.
公開者
Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻
11-30
刊行年月
2011-11
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
関連情報 (references)
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1130.pdf
言語
英語
カテゴリ
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
論文詳細を表示
著者版フラグ
none
NII資源タイプ
テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ
text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.11-30
DC.title
Fair Contracts
DC.creator
Ishiguro, Shingo
DC.publisher
Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766
英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF
2011-11
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
DC.subject
Moral Hazard
Incentive Contracts
Fairness
DCTERMS.abstract
In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimalcontracts, which we call “fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no–envyness. Theincentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficientcontracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No–envyness isequity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of othersin the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension betweenincentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple featurethat risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costlyaction.
citation_title
Fair Contracts
citation_author
Ishiguro, Shingo
citation_publisher
Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language
英語
citation_date
2011-11
citation_journal_title
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume
11-30
citation_public_url
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
citation_keywords
Moral Hazard
Incentive Contracts
Fairness