Fair Contracts

Ishiguro, Shingo

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論文情報

タイトル	Fair Contracts
著者	Ishiguro, Shingo Ishiguro, Shingo
キーワード等	Moral Hazard
	Incentive Contracts
	Fairness
抄録	In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimalcontracts, which we call “fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no–envyness. Theincentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficientcontracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No–envyness isequity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of othersin the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension betweenincentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple featurethat risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costlyaction.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	11-30
刊行年月	2011-11
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1130.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.11-30
DC.title	Fair Contracts
DC.creator	Ishiguro, Shingo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-11
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
DC.subject	Moral Hazard
	Incentive Contracts
	Fairness
DCTERMS.abstract	In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimalcontracts, which we call “fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no–envyness. Theincentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficientcontracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No–envyness isequity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of othersin the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension betweenincentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple featurethat risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costlyaction.
citation_title	Fair Contracts
citation_author	Ishiguro, Shingo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-11
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	11-30
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13634
citation_keywords	Moral Hazard
	Incentive Contracts
	Fairness

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