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Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.823

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Morimoto, Shuhei

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2011-11

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700

We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Morimoto, Shuhei

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2011-11

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

823

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700