Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Morimoto, Shuhei

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論文情報

タイトル	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
著者	Morimoto, Shuhei Morimoto, Shuhei
キーワード等	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain
抄録	We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	823
刊行年月	2011-11
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0823.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.823
DC.title	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
DC.creator	Morimoto, Shuhei
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-11
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
DC.subject	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
citation_title	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
citation_author	Morimoto, Shuhei
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-11
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	823
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
citation_keywords	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain

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