Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Morimoto, Shuhei

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論文情報

タイトル	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
著者	Morimoto, Shuhei Morimoto, Shuhei
キーワード等	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain
抄録	We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	823
刊行年月	2011-11
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0823.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.823
DC.title	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
DC.creator	Morimoto, Shuhei
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-11
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
DC.subject	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
citation_title	Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
citation_author	Morimoto, Shuhei
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-11
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	823
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
citation_keywords	public good
	probabilistic rule
	stochastic dominance relation
	strategy-proofness
	minimally rich domain
	maximal domain

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