Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Morimoto, Shuhei

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2011, 823

アクセス数:290件（2025-06-21 04:22 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700

論文情報

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タイトル
Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
著者
NRID
1000050614145 1000050614145
著者名
Morimoto, Shuhei
キーワード等
public good
probabilistic rule
stochastic dominance relation
strategy-proofness
minimally rich domain
maximal domain
抄録
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
823
刊行年月
2011-11
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2011/DP0823.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers