An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices

Akai, Kenju; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro

An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices

Akai, Kenju; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2010, 743, 1-24

アクセス数:137件（2025-03-14 18:10 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13826

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タイトル	An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices
著者	NRID 1000020583214 1000020583214 著者名 Akai, Kenju
	NRID 1000020205628 1000020205628 著者名 Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	Public procurement
	First-price auction
	Experiment
	Abnormally low tender
	Endogenous minimum price
内容	ISER discussion paper
内容	June 2009, Revised July 2010
抄録	Several European countries and many Japanese local governments began including endogenous minimum prices (EMPs) in first-price auctions (FPAs) in their public procurements. The EMP is calculated based on its relation to the average of all bids or to some lowest bids. Any bid lower than the EMP is considered abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement procedure. Producers who join this new auction institution have the incentive to raise their bids and pull up the EMP in order to exclude others. A theoretical analysis reveals that the EMP does not affect winning bids but changes the Nash equilibria of the standard FPA that does not have any minimum prices. A laboratory analysis reveals that the winning bids of this new auction institution (i) are close to the production cost and coincide with those of the standard FPA under the identical cost condition and (ii) are higher than the lowest production cost and those of the standard FPA under our different cost condition when subjects’ identifications and bids are revealed.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	743
ページ	1-24
刊行年月	2010-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13826
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0743R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2010-07

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2010, 743, p. 1-24
DC.title	An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices
DC.creator	Akai, Kenju
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2010-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0743R.pdf
DC.subject	Public procurement
	First-price auction
	Experiment
	Abnormally low tender
	Endogenous minimum price
DC.description	ISER discussion paper
DC.description	June 2009, Revised July 2010
DCTERMS.abstract	Several European countries and many Japanese local governments began including endogenous minimum prices (EMPs) in first-price auctions (FPAs) in their public procurements. The EMP is calculated based on its relation to the average of all bids or to some lowest bids. Any bid lower than the EMP is considered abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement procedure. Producers who join this new auction institution have the incentive to raise their bids and pull up the EMP in order to exclude others. A theoretical analysis reveals that the EMP does not affect winning bids but changes the Nash equilibria of the standard FPA that does not have any minimum prices. A laboratory analysis reveals that the winning bids of this new auction institution (i) are close to the production cost and coincide with those of the standard FPA under the identical cost condition and (ii) are higher than the lowest production cost and those of the standard FPA under our different cost condition when subjects’ identifications and bids are revealed.
DC.format	13826
citation_title	An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices
citation_author	Akai, Kenju
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2010-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	743
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	24
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13826
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0743R.pdf

An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices

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