Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard

Ogawa, Ryo

アクセス数:176件（2025-01-17 23:03 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831

論文情報

タイトル	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
著者	NRID 1000050533204 1000050533204 著者名 Ogawa, Ryo
キーワード等	dynamic moral hazard
	history dependence
	simple contract
	first-order stochastic dominance
内容	January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011
抄録	We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	767
ページ	1-24
刊行年月	2011-05
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0767RR.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2011-05

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2011, 767, p. 1-24
DC.title	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
DC.creator	Ogawa, Ryo
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-05
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0767RR.pdf
DC.subject	dynamic moral hazard
	history dependence
	simple contract
	first-order stochastic dominance
DC.description	January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011
DCTERMS.abstract	We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.
DC.format	13831
citation_title	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
citation_author	Ogawa, Ryo
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-05
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	767
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	24
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0767RR.pdf

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