Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard

Ogawa, Ryo

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タイトル	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
著者	Ogawa, Ryo Ogawa, Ryo
キーワード等	dynamic moral hazard
	history dependence
	simple contract
	first-order stochastic dominance
内容	January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011
抄録	We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
更新日付	2011-05
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	767
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	24
刊行年月	2011-05
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831
関連情報 (references)	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0767RR.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.767
DC.title	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
DC.creator	Ogawa, Ryo
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-05
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831
DC.subject	dynamic moral hazard
	history dependence
	simple contract
	first-order stochastic dominance
DC.description	January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011
DCTERMS.abstract	We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.
citation_title	Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
citation_author	Ogawa, Ryo
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-05
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	767
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	24
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13831
citation_keywords	dynamic moral hazard
	history dependence
	simple contract
	first-order stochastic dominance

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