Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration

Harstad, Ronald M.

Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration

Harstad, Ronald M.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2011, 819

アクセス数:150件（2025-03-25 20:41 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13859

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タイトル	Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration
著者	著者名 Harstad, Ronald M.
抄録	Laboratory experiments reporting on shortfalls from allocative efficiency of allocationmechanisms depend on the induced-values methodology, which cannot be extended to thefield. Harstad [2011] proposes to observe efficiency of allocation mechanisms withoutknowing motivations via behavior in appropriately designed aftermarkets. This paperdemonstrates the approach in a highly simplified economy: allocation of a single unit of anabstract commodity. In the context studied, second-price auctions are observed to yieldsignificantly greater behavioral inefficiencies than first-price auctions, both in terms offrequency of behaviorally inefficient outcomes, and in terms of the expected size of gainsfrom aftermarket trade missed by the auction itself. The design is shown to be field-ready.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	819
刊行年月	2011-10
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13859
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0819.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2011, 819
DC.title	Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration
DC.creator	Harstad, Ronald M.
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-10
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0819.pdf
DCTERMS.abstract	Laboratory experiments reporting on shortfalls from allocative efficiency of allocationmechanisms depend on the induced-values methodology, which cannot be extended to thefield. Harstad [2011] proposes to observe efficiency of allocation mechanisms withoutknowing motivations via behavior in appropriately designed aftermarkets. This paperdemonstrates the approach in a highly simplified economy: allocation of a single unit of anabstract commodity. In the context studied, second-price auctions are observed to yieldsignificantly greater behavioral inefficiencies than first-price auctions, both in terms offrequency of behaviorally inefficient outcomes, and in terms of the expected size of gainsfrom aftermarket trade missed by the auction itself. The design is shown to be field-ready.
DC.format	13859
citation_title	Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration
citation_author	Harstad, Ronald M.
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-10
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	819
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13859
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0819.pdf

Behavioral Efficiency II : A Simple Laboratory Demonstration

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