Free entry, regulatory competition, and globalization

Miyagiwa, Kaz; Sato, Yasuhiro

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論文情報

タイトル	Free entry, regulatory competition, and globalization
著者	Miyagiwa, Kaz Miyagiwa, Kaz
著者	Sato, Yasuhiro Sato, Yasuhiro
キーワード等	Entry Policy
	Excessive entry
	Globalization
	Regulatory competition
抄録	This paper examines the optimal entry policy towards oligopoly in a globalized world.In an open economy free entry is socially suboptimal, but corrective tax policy to curbentry proves insuffcient unless internationally harmonized. Thus, while conferring the gainsfrom trade, globalization prevents countries from pursuing the optimal entry policy. Whencountries are small, the gains from trade dominate the losses from a suboptimal entry policy,but as markets grow the result is reversed, making trade inferior to autarky. Therefore, theneed for tax harmonization grows as the world economy grows. This paper also contributes tothe international tax competition literature through the discovery of the reverse home marketeffect.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	12-02
刊行年月	2012-03
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13898
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1202.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.12-02
DC.title	Free entry, regulatory competition, and globalization
DC.creator	Miyagiwa, Kaz
DC.creator	Sato, Yasuhiro
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2012-03
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13898
DC.subject	Entry Policy
	Excessive entry
	Globalization
	Regulatory competition
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper examines the optimal entry policy towards oligopoly in a globalized world.In an open economy free entry is socially suboptimal, but corrective tax policy to curbentry proves insuffcient unless internationally harmonized. Thus, while conferring the gainsfrom trade, globalization prevents countries from pursuing the optimal entry policy. Whencountries are small, the gains from trade dominate the losses from a suboptimal entry policy,but as markets grow the result is reversed, making trade inferior to autarky. Therefore, theneed for tax harmonization grows as the world economy grows. This paper also contributes tothe international tax competition literature through the discovery of the reverse home marketeffect.
citation_title	Free entry, regulatory competition, and globalization
citation_author	Miyagiwa, Kaz
citation_author	Sato, Yasuhiro
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2012-03
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	12-02
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13898
citation_keywords	Entry Policy
	Excessive entry
	Globalization
	Regulatory competition

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