A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect

Hatsumi, Kentaro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2011, 736, 1-4

アクセス数:192件（2025-03-18 03:40 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13952

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect
著者
NRID
1000040633417 1000040633417
著者名
Hatsumi, Kentaro
キーワード等
charitable fund-raising
global game
leadership giving
philanthropy
内容
ISER discussion paper
April 2009, Revised September 2009, Secondly Revised May 2011
抄録
If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that merely by the effect of seed money to shift the threshold requirement of the donations for project success downwards, the proportion of donors and the total amount of donations strictly and continuously increase with the amount of seed money. This result is partially compatible with the field experimental evidence in List and Lucking-Reiley [List, J. A., Lucking-Reiley, D., 2002. The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110 (1), 215-233].
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
736
ページ
1-4
刊行年月
2011-05
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13952
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2009/DP0736RR.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日
2011-05