Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma

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論文情報

タイトル	Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
著者	NRID 1000020552277 1000020552277 著者名 Fujinaka, Yuji
著者	NRID 1000080448654 1000080448654 著者名 Wakayama, Takuma
キーワード等	Secure implementation
	Sequential dictatorship
	Strict core
	Strategy-proofness
	Shapley-Scarf housing markets
内容	December 2008 Revised February 2009
抄録	This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	727
ページ	1-25
刊行年月	2009-02
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13990
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0727R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2009-02

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.727
DC.title	Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
DC.creator	Fujinaka, Yuji
DC.creator	Wakayama, Takuma
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2009-02
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0727R.pdf
DC.subject	Secure implementation
	Sequential dictatorship
	Strict core
	Strategy-proofness
	Shapley-Scarf housing markets
DC.description	December 2008 Revised February 2009
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
citation_title	Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
citation_author	Fujinaka, Yuji
citation_author	Wakayama, Takuma
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2009-02
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	727
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	25
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/13990
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0727R.pdf

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