International Industry Spillover and Carbon Leakage under the Kyoto Protocol

キョウト ギテイショ ジュンシュ ニヨル コクサイテキ サンギョウ コウゾウ ヘンカ ト タンソ リーケージー ドウガクテキ オウヨウ イッパン キンコウ モデル ニヨル ブンセキ

タメチカ, ハナエ

Tamechika, Hanae

伴, 金美

バン, カネミ

Ban, Kanemi

オオサカ　ダイガク　ケイザイ　ガッカイ

The Economic Society of Osaka University

京都議定書

産業構造変化

炭素削減

炭素リーケージ

carbon abatement

Carbon Leakage

CGE model

Kyoto Protocol

relocation of industries

The Kyoto Protocol sets carbon emission targets for 2008-2012 for the Annex B countries. If such unilateral action by one set of countries is to be taken, the associated competitive effects may lead to a significant relocation of the Annex B countries’ industries, which can induce “carbon leakage” as a result. This paper explores these issues using a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model of the world economy. In particular, we address the influence of the United States’ and Australian withdrawals. In order to analyse the effects of different carbon abatement regimes, the following three scenarios are set up: a reference case, no carbon permit trading, and carbon permit trading among the Annex B countries other than the United States and Australia. The results suggest that a maximum of 20% of energy-intensive production may relocate away from the emissions-capped countries, with a leakage rate as high as 53%, where countries apply domestic carbon taxes. The trading scenario turns out to sift up to 8% of energy-intensive production from abating countries towards non-abating countries, generating roughly a 27% leakage rate. Permit trading considerably reduces the magnitude of relocation and leakage under the Kyoto Protocol to non-abating countries as compared to the no trading case. These leakages are higher than those in the literature. This is because we take into account the non-compliance of the United States. Moreover, the values of relocation and leakage to the United States are quite significant.

伴, 金美