学術雑誌論文

本学関連学会

text

大阪大学経済学. 2007, 57(1), p. 21-34

日本語

text

2007-06

論文

In this paper I examine how Arthur C. Pigou (1877–1959) treated his contemporary system of minimum wage called Trade Boards in Economics of Welfare (1920) and other writings. Pigou was not wholeheartedly affirmative towards it, though recognizing the need of minimum wage: that is, he thought the Trade Boards system was likely to be operated badly. First, dealing with the practicability of the enforcement of minimum wage, Pigou recognized that, in an industry in which workers were not only poorly paid but poorly organized, there existed the fear of collusion between an employer and exploited workers. He expected trade unions to make this fear less likely. Pigou adduced a hopeful result that introduction of trade boards had let unorganized workers organized, concluding that the enforcement of minimum wage was generally effective. Next, Pigou distinguished two causes for unfair wages that was exceptionally low relatively among equally skilled trades: (1) employers taking advantage of his monopsonistic power in a labor market, or in his term “exploitation”; and (2) excess supply of labor in that trade. Minimum wage, he argued, was a remedy in so far as an unfair wage was due to the first cause. Lastly, however, Pigou’s displeasure with the actual operation of the trade boards centered on two problems. One was that the since the principle was unclear on which the rate of minimum wage should be determined, this incurred the disturbing effect on labor market. The other was that trade boards were applied to highly-paid workers as well as poorly-paid laborers; and Pigou regarded this fact as the misdirected expansion of state’s coercive power. In conclusion, I stress Pigou’s concern about appropriate use of state’s power on each different group of workers.

10.18910/15397

15397

ピグーの最低賃金論 : 賃金委員会法にたいする評価を中心として

高見, 典和

大阪大学経済学会

日本語

2007-06

大阪大学経済学

57

1

21

34

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/15397

10.18910/15397

https://doi.org/10.18910/15397