学術雑誌論文

本学関連学会

text

大阪大学経済学. 2008, 57(4), p. 22-31

日本語

text

2008-03

論文

Dispite the expansion of services and the seemingly rowing importance of ratings, some disquiet is now being expressed about the activities of rating agencies. The collapse of subprime mortgages in the US spiced up the debate over the expertise of credit rating agencies. The failure of collapses have raised additional concerns about potential ‘conflict of interest’. The main users of credit ratings are investors, but the principal source of income for the agencies is rating charges paid by issuers, not the rating subscription fees of investors. For example, about 90 percent of Moody’s and Fitch’s revenues come from issuer fees. The heavy dependence on client fees therefore raises questions about the independence of the agencies in assigning grades. In some cases a rating agency will rate a firm mainly from public information even though the firm has not asked for a rating; these are called ‘unsolicited’ ratings. Here, the agency uses public information to rate a firm although this may be supplemented by information given by the firm’s managers. This raises number of questions: do ratings vary between solicited and unsolicited? Recipients of unsolicited ratings argue that the assigned ratings are too low and reflect a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the rated firms. The purpose of this research is to examine this claim using unsolicited Japanese firms’ ratings by JCR and S&P. The results show that there is not a significant difference in the level of ratings, but some significant unsensitivity to fundamentals are found. Overall, the findings of this study have important policy implications for the reform of the credit rating industry and for the Third Pillar of the New Basel Accord.

10.18910/17363

17363

非依頼長期債格付けの評価傾向に関する分析 : JCRとS&Pのケース

萩原, 統宏

大阪大学経済学会

日本語

2008-03

大阪大学経済学

57

4

22

31

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/17363

10.18910/17363

https://doi.org/10.18910/17363