Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of International Climate Agreements

Nagashima, Miyuki

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タイトル	Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of International Climate Agreements
著者	Nagashima, Miyuki Nagashima, Miyuki
キーワード等	International environmental agreement
キーワード等	Applied game theory
抄録	Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine interactions between countries in the negotiations on climate change, and have emphasized difficulties in designing such a voluntary agreement. This paper presents the current status of international negotiation on climate change control and the observed scientific evidence, and provides an overview of literature on game-theoretic analysis of climate coalition formation. The role of some flexible mechanisms and potential extensions will be discussed to promote participation in the international agreement on climate change.
公開者	大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
公開者 (ヨミ)	オオサカダイガクダイガクインコクサイコウキョウセイサクケンキュウカ
掲載誌名	国際公共政策研究
巻	16
号	1
開始ページ	125
終了ページ	134
刊行年月	2011-09
ISSN	13428101
NCID	AA1115271X
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23043
言語	英語
カテゴリ	紀要論文 Departmental Bulletin Paper
カテゴリ	国際公共政策研究 / 16巻1号(2011-09)

著者版フラグ	publisher
NII資源タイプ	紀要論文
ローカル資源タイプ	紀要論文
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	国際公共政策研究.16(1) P.125-P.134
DC.title	Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of International Climate Agreements
DC.creator	Nagashima, Miyuki
DC.publisher	大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2011-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23043
DC.subject	International environmental agreement
DC.subject	Applied game theory
DCTERMS.abstract	Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine interactions between countries in the negotiations on climate change, and have emphasized difficulties in designing such a voluntary agreement. This paper presents the current status of international negotiation on climate change control and the observed scientific evidence, and provides an overview of literature on game-theoretic analysis of climate coalition formation. The role of some flexible mechanisms and potential extensions will be discussed to promote participation in the international agreement on climate change.
citation_title	Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of International Climate Agreements
citation_author	Nagashima, Miyuki
citation_publisher	大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2011-09
citation_journal_title	国際公共政策研究
citation_volume	16
citation_issue	1
citation_firstpage	125
citation_lastpage	134
citation_issn	13428101
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23043
citation_keywords	International environmental agreement
citation_keywords	Applied game theory

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