Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights : A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

Ono, Tetsuo

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論文情報

タイトル	Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights : A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints
著者	Ono, Tetsuo Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等	Borrowing constraint
	Marital status
	Gender wage gap
	Derived pen-sion rights
	Political economy
内容	* Revised： [11-32-Rev., 2012]
抄録	This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low in- tertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing-constrained one-breadwinner cou- ples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the for- mer attain a higher bene t-to-cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two- breadwinner couples produce an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
更新日付	2013-01
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	11-32-Rev.2
刊行年月	2013-01
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23356
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1132R2.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.11-32-Rev.2
DC.title	Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights : A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints
DC.creator	Ono, Tetsuo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-01
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23356
DC.subject	Borrowing constraint
	Marital status
	Gender wage gap
	Derived pen-sion rights
	Political economy
DC.description	* Revised： [11-32-Rev., 2012]
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low in- tertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing-constrained one-breadwinner cou- ples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the for- mer attain a higher bene t-to-cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two- breadwinner couples produce an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate.
citation_title	Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights : A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints
citation_author	Ono, Tetsuo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-01
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	11-32-Rev.2
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23356
citation_keywords	Borrowing constraint
	Marital status
	Gender wage gap
	Derived pen-sion rights
	Political economy

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