Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric

Gunay, Hikmet; Meng, Xin; Nagelberg, Mark

Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric

Gunay, Hikmet; Meng, Xin; Nagelberg, Mark

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 849, 1-10

アクセス数:167件（2025-05-11 22:36 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23368

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タイトル	Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric
著者	著者名 Gunay, Hikmet
	著者名 Meng, Xin
	著者名 Nagelberg, Mark
キーワード等	Auction
	Reserve (Reservation) Price
	Asymmetric Bidders
内容	July 2012. Revised March 2017.
抄録	We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are 𝑁 types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific “distribution type” of each bidder. In this paper, we give sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Then, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	849
ページ	1-10
刊行年月	2017-03
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23368
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0849R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2017-03

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2017, 849, p. 1-10
DC.title	Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric
DC.creator	Gunay, Hikmet
	Meng, Xin
	Nagelberg, Mark
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-03
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0849R.pdf
DC.subject	Auction
	Reserve (Reservation) Price
	Asymmetric Bidders
DC.description	July 2012. Revised March 2017.
DCTERMS.abstract	We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are 𝑁 types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific “distribution type” of each bidder. In this paper, we give sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Then, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient.
DC.format	23368
citation_title	Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric
citation_author	Gunay, Hikmet
	Meng, Xin
	Nagelberg, Mark
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-03
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	849
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	10
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23368
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0849R.pdf

Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric

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