Environmental Regulation and Technology Transfers

Asano, Takao; Matsushima, Noriaki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2012, 862

アクセス数:212件（2025-05-09 19:35 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23402

論文情報

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タイトル
Environmental Regulation and Technology Transfers
著者
NRID
1000040423157 1000040423157
著者名
Asano, Takao
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
キーワード等
Environmental regulation
Technology transfer
International competition
Duopoly
抄録
This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm’s production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology support the Porter hypothesis, which states that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
862
刊行年月
2012-12
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23402
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0862.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers