Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo

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論文情報

タイトル	Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision
著者	Arawatari, Ryo Arawatari, Ryo
著者	Ono, Tetsuo Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等	Borrowing constraint
	Old-age social security
	Forward intergenera- tional public goods
	Ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
	Wage inequality
内容	* Revised： [11-26, 2011]
内容	* Revised： [11-26-Rev., 2013]
抄録	This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive gen-erations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle-income individuals favor a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with the borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youthful consump-tion.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
更新日付	2013-04
更新日付	2013-08
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	11-26-Rev.2
刊行年月	2013-08
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24715
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1126R2.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.11-26-Rev.2
DC.title	Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision
DC.creator	Arawatari, Ryo
DC.creator	Ono, Tetsuo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-08
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24715
DC.subject	Borrowing constraint
	Old-age social security
	Forward intergenera- tional public goods
	Ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
	Wage inequality
DC.description	* Revised： [11-26, 2011]
DC.description	* Revised： [11-26-Rev., 2013]
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero-geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive gen-erations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where low- and high-income individuals form a coalition in favor of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle-income individuals favor a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with the borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youthful consump-tion.
citation_title	Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision
citation_author	Arawatari, Ryo
citation_author	Ono, Tetsuo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-08
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	11-26-Rev.2
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24715
citation_keywords	Borrowing constraint
	Old-age social security
	Forward intergenera- tional public goods
	Ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
	Wage inequality

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