テクニカルレポート

ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー

text

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2013, 11-31-Rev., p. 1-14

Relationships and Growth

Ishiguro, Shingo

Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

英語

text

2013-05

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1131R.pdf

* Revised： [11-31, 2011]

In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how di?erent contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements endogenously emerge and are dynamically linked with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third-party institutions (courts), while relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without any third-party involvement. The novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co-evolution of these di?erent enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions, all of which are jointly determined. We then characterize the equilibrium paths of such dynamic processes and show the time structure of relational contracting in the endogenous process of economic development. In particular, we show that relational contracting fosters the emergence of a market-based economy in low-development stages but its role declines as the economy grows and enters high-development stages.

24749

Relationships and Growth

Ishiguro, Shingo

Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

英語

2013-05

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

11-31-Rev.

1

14

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24749

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1131R.pdf