Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach

Ono, Tetsuo

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論文情報

タイトル	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
著者	Ono, Tetsuo Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等	Public education
	Social security
	Intergenerational con ict
内容	* Revised： [13-06, 2013]
内容	* Revised： [13-06-Rev., 2013]
抄録	This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two con?icting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model derives multiple indeterminate political equilibria and demonstrates that the di?erence between the two equilibria in terms of policies and lifetime utility depends on longevity. In particular, the model prediction with respect to the di?erences in policies and longevity is consistent with the empirical evidence in developed countries.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
更新日付	2013-09
更新日付	2014-09
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	13-06-Rev.2
刊行年月	2014-09
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1306R2.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.13-06-Rev.2
DC.title	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
DC.creator	Ono, Tetsuo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2014-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764
DC.subject	Public education
	Social security
	Intergenerational con ict
DC.description	* Revised： [13-06, 2013]
DC.description	* Revised： [13-06-Rev., 2013]
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two con?icting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model derives multiple indeterminate political equilibria and demonstrates that the di?erence between the two equilibria in terms of policies and lifetime utility depends on longevity. In particular, the model prediction with respect to the di?erences in policies and longevity is consistent with the empirical evidence in developed countries.
citation_title	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
citation_author	Ono, Tetsuo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2014-09
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	13-06-Rev.2
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764
citation_keywords	Public education
	Social security
	Intergenerational con ict

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