Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach

Ono, Tetsuo

Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach

Ono, Tetsuo

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2014, 13-06-Rev.2

アクセス数:394件（2025-07-08 21:39 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
著者	NRID 1000050305661 1000050305661 ORCID 0000-0002-9838-828X 0000-0002-9838-828X researchmap permalink tono tono Scopus Author ID 7403947415 7403947415 著者名 Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等	Public education
	Social security
	Intergenerational con ict
内容	* Revised： [13-06, 2013]
内容	* Revised： [13-06-Rev., 2013]
抄録	This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two con?icting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model derives multiple indeterminate political equilibria and demonstrates that the di?erence between the two equilibria in terms of policies and lifetime utility depends on longevity. In particular, the model prediction with respect to the di?erences in policies and longevity is consistent with the empirical evidence in developed countries.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	13-06-Rev.2
刊行年月	2014-09
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1306R2.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
最終更新日	2013-09
最終更新日	2014-09

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2014, 13-06-Rev.2
DC.title	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
DC.creator	Ono, Tetsuo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2014-09
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1306R2.pdf
DC.subject	Public education
	Social security
	Intergenerational con ict
DC.description	* Revised： [13-06, 2013]
DC.description	* Revised： [13-06-Rev., 2013]
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two con?icting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model derives multiple indeterminate political equilibria and demonstrates that the di?erence between the two equilibria in terms of policies and lifetime utility depends on longevity. In particular, the model prediction with respect to the di?erences in policies and longevity is consistent with the empirical evidence in developed countries.
DC.format	24764
citation_title	Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach
citation_author	Ono, Tetsuo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2014-09
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	13-06-Rev.2
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24764
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1306R2.pdf

Public Education and Social Security : A Political Economy Approach

論文情報

論文詳細を表示