A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?

Mori, Yusuke

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2013, 863

アクセス数:281件（2025-07-03 13:00 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924

論文情報

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タイトル
A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
著者
NRID
1000050747590 1000050747590
著者名
Mori, Yusuke
キーワード等
Reference-dependent preference
self-serving bias
contracts as reference points
transaction cost; ex post adaptation
抄録
We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
863
刊行年月
2013-01
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers