ようこそ ゲスト さん
雑誌ブラウズ
雑誌 全て
大阪大学 刊行物
ランキング
アクセスランキング
ダウンロードランキング
博士論文のみをさがす
資料種別
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article
博士論文 本文あり Doctoral Thesis with Full Text
博士論文 Doctoral Thesis
紀要論文 Departmental Bulletin Paper
研究報告書 Research Paper
学内報告書等 Reports
単行書 Book
会議発表用資料 Presentation
会議発表論文 Conference Paper
教材 Teaching Material
貴重書 Rare Materials
データセット Dataset
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
一般記事 Article
本学関連学会 Related Societies
その他 other
このアイテムのアクセス数:
29
件
(
2018-04-22
04:20 集計
)
このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください:http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
論文情報
タイトル
A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
著者
Mori, Yusuke
Mori, Yusuke
キーワード等
Reference-dependent preference
self-serving bias
contracts as reference points
transaction cost; ex post adaptation
抄録
We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
公開者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻
863
刊行年月
2013-01
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
関連情報 (references)
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf
言語
英語
論文詳細を表示
著者版フラグ
none
NII資源タイプ
テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ
text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.863
DC.title
A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
DC.creator
Mori, Yusuke
DC.publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766
英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF
2013-01
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
DC.subject
Reference-dependent preference
self-serving bias
contracts as reference points
transaction cost; ex post adaptation
DCTERMS.abstract
We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
citation_title
A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
citation_author
Mori, Yusuke
citation_publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language
英語
citation_date
2013-01
citation_journal_title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume
863
citation_public_url
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
citation_keywords
Reference-dependent preference
self-serving bias
contracts as reference points
transaction cost; ex post adaptation