A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?

Mori, Yusuke

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論文情報

タイトル	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
著者	Mori, Yusuke Mori, Yusuke
キーワード等	Reference-dependent preference
	self-serving bias
	contracts as reference points
	transaction cost; ex post adaptation
抄録	We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	863
刊行年月	2013-01
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.863
DC.title	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
DC.creator	Mori, Yusuke
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-01
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
DC.subject	Reference-dependent preference
	self-serving bias
	contracts as reference points
	transaction cost; ex post adaptation
DCTERMS.abstract	We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
citation_title	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
citation_author	Mori, Yusuke
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	863
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
citation_keywords	Reference-dependent preference
	self-serving bias
	contracts as reference points
	transaction cost; ex post adaptation

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