A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?

Mori, Yusuke

このアイテムのアクセス数:139件（2023-09-26 11:48 集計）

このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924

論文情報

タイトル	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
著者	NRID 1000050747590 1000050747590 著者名 Mori, Yusuke
キーワード等	Reference-dependent preference
	self-serving bias
	contracts as reference points
	transaction cost; ex post adaptation
抄録	We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	863
刊行年月	2013-01
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2013, 863
DC.title	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
DC.creator	Mori, Yusuke
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-01
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf
DC.subject	Reference-dependent preference
	self-serving bias
	contracts as reference points
	transaction cost; ex post adaptation
DCTERMS.abstract	We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate’s disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and shading), we point out that the choice of governance structure affects trading parties’ expectations about outcome of ex post adaptations and show that a subordinate is likely to obey orders of his boss because he is expected to do so. Nevertheless, our study also points out that such a positive aspect of authority comes with subordinate’s psychological disutility.
citation_title	A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries : Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?
citation_author	Mori, Yusuke
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	863
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24924
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0863.pdf

論文情報

論文詳細を表示