The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2013, 874, 1-4

アクセス数:218件（2025-05-09 19:30 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926

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タイトル	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
著者	NRID 1000080725060 1000080725060 著者名 Masuda, Takehito
	NRID 1000020513120 1000020513120 著者名 Okano, Yoshitaka
	NRID 1000020205628 1000020205628 著者名 Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
キーワード等	Public good experiment
	Approval mechanism
	Multiple implementation
内容	May 2013. Revised September 2013.
抄録	We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	874
ページ	1-4
刊行年月	2013-09
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2013-09

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2013, 874, p. 1-4
DC.title	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
DC.creator	Masuda, Takehito
	Okano, Yoshitaka
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-09
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
DC.subject	Public good experiment
	Approval mechanism
	Multiple implementation
DC.description	May 2013. Revised September 2013.
DCTERMS.abstract	We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
DC.format	24926
citation_title	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
citation_author	Masuda, Takehito
	Okano, Yoshitaka
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-09
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	874
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	4
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf

The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally

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