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2021-01-22
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このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください:http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
論文情報
タイトル
The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
著者
Masuda, Takehito
Masuda, Takehito
Okano, Yoshitaka
Okano, Yoshitaka
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
キーワード等
Public good experiment
Approval mechanism
Multiple implementation
内容
May 2013. Revised September 2013.
抄録
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
公開者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
更新日付
2013-09
掲載誌名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻
874
開始ページ
1
終了ページ
4
刊行年月
2013-09
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
関連情報 (references)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
言語
英語
カテゴリ
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
論文詳細を表示
著者版フラグ
none
NII資源タイプ
テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ
ディスカッション/ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ
text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.874
DC.title
The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
DC.creator
Masuda, Takehito
Okano, Yoshitaka
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
DC.publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766
英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF
2013-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
DC.subject
Public good experiment
Approval mechanism
Multiple implementation
DC.description
May 2013. Revised September 2013.
DCTERMS.abstract
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
citation_title
The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
citation_author
Masuda, Takehito
Okano, Yoshitaka
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
citation_publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language
英語
citation_date
2013-09
citation_journal_title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume
874
citation_firstpage
1
citation_lastpage
4
citation_public_url
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
citation_keywords
Public good experiment
Approval mechanism
Multiple implementation