The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

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論文情報

タイトル	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
著者	Masuda, Takehito Masuda, Takehito
	Okano, Yoshitaka Okano, Yoshitaka
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
キーワード等	Public good experiment
	Approval mechanism
	Multiple implementation
内容	May 2013. Revised September 2013.
抄録	We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
更新日付	2013-09
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	874
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	4
刊行年月	2013-09
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
関連情報 (references)	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.874
DC.title	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
DC.creator	Masuda, Takehito
	Okano, Yoshitaka
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
DC.subject	Public good experiment
	Approval mechanism
	Multiple implementation
DC.description	May 2013. Revised September 2013.
DCTERMS.abstract	We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
citation_title	The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
citation_author	Masuda, Takehito
	Okano, Yoshitaka
	Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-09
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	874
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	4
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/24926
citation_keywords	Public good experiment
	Approval mechanism
	Multiple implementation

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