Waiting For Signalling Quality

Hikmet, Gunay; University of Manitoba

Waiting For Signalling Quality

Hikmet, Gunay; University of Manitoba

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2013, 877, 1-33

アクセス数:266件（2025-07-01 19:16 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25849

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タイトル	Waiting For Signalling Quality
著者	著者名 Hikmet, Gunay
著者	著者名 University of Manitoba
キーワード等	Strategic delay
	Introductory prices
	Penetration pricing
	Cream-skimming
	Monopoly pricing
	Coasian dynamics
抄録	When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and \waiting" strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the monopolist o®ers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. We also ¯nd two types of separating equilibria: one where high type signals its quality by choosing a di®erent price than the low type in the ¯rst period, and another where the high-type monopolist announces the product in the ¯rst period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signalling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signalling device.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	877
ページ	1-33
刊行年月	2013-07-26
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25849
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0877.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2013, 877, p. 1-33
DC.title	Waiting For Signalling Quality
DC.creator	Hikmet, Gunay
DC.creator	University of Manitoba
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-07-26
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0877.pdf
DC.subject	Strategic delay
	Introductory prices
	Penetration pricing
	Cream-skimming
	Monopoly pricing
	Coasian dynamics
DCTERMS.abstract	When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and \waiting" strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the monopolist o®ers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. We also ¯nd two types of separating equilibria: one where high type signals its quality by choosing a di®erent price than the low type in the ¯rst period, and another where the high-type monopolist announces the product in the ¯rst period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signalling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signalling device.
DC.format	25849
citation_title	Waiting For Signalling Quality
citation_author	Hikmet, Gunay
citation_author	University of Manitoba
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-07-26
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	877
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	33
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25849
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0877.pdf

Waiting For Signalling Quality

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