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テクニカルレポート

ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー

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Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.877 P.1-P.33

Waiting For Signalling Quality

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-07-26

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25849

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and \waiting" strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the monopolist o®ers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. We also ¯nd two types of separating equilibria: one where high type signals its quality by choosing a di®erent price than the low type in the ¯rst period, and another where the high-type monopolist announces the product in the ¯rst period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signalling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signalling device.

Waiting For Signalling Quality

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-07-26

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

877

1

33

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25849