How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

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論文情報

タイトル	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
著者	Kitamura, Hiroshi Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki Matsushima, Noriaki
	Sato, Misato Sato, Misato
キーワード等	Antitrust policy
	Entry deterrence
	Exclusive supply contracts
	Transformational technology
内容	August 2013. Revised September 2015
抄録	This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
更新日付	2015-09
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	878
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	39
刊行年月	2015-09
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
関連情報 (references)	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0878R.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.878 P.1-P.36
DC.title	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
DC.creator	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
	Sato, Misato
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2015-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
DC.subject	Antitrust policy
	Entry deterrence
	Exclusive supply contracts
	Transformational technology
DC.description	August 2013. Revised September 2015
DCTERMS.abstract	This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
citation_title	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
citation_author	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
	Sato, Misato
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2015-09
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	878
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	39
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
citation_keywords	Antitrust policy
	Entry deterrence
	Exclusive supply contracts
	Transformational technology

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