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テクニカルレポート

ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー

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Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.878 P.1-P.36

How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-07-21

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850

This study constructs a model for examining anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform the input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent can deter socially efficient entry via exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument where a single seller, a single buyer, and a single entrant exist.

How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-07-21

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

878

1

36

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850