How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2015, 878, 1-39

アクセス数:366件（2025-07-06 19:00 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850

論文情報

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タイトル
How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
著者
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
著者名
Kitamura, Hiroshi
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
著者名
Sato, Misato
キーワード等
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive supply contracts
Transformational technology
内容
August 2013. Revised September 2015
抄録
This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
878
ページ
1-39
刊行年月
2015-09
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0878R.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日
2015-09