Multilayered Tournaments

Ishida, Junichiro

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論文情報

タイトル	Multilayered Tournaments
著者	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
キーワード等	Tournaments
	Cooperation
	Competition
	Multi-task problem
	Sabotage
抄録	In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which diﬀerent levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of competitive environment. Among other things, we ﬁnd that: (i) an increase in individual incentives, holding the level of team incentives ﬁxed, can lower total eﬀort as it induces ineﬃcient allocation of eﬀort; (ii) the optimal level of individual incentives depends on and is complementary to the level of team incentives. The analysis illuminates the essential role of economic subgroups, such as ﬁrms, in achieving some degree of cooperation in an inherently competitive environment, and provides an explanation for why high-powered incentives are more common in market arrangements than within ﬁrms.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	879
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	27
刊行年月	2013-08-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25851
関連情報 (references)	関連識別子 http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0879.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.879 p.1-p.27
DC.title	Multilayered Tournaments
DC.creator	Ishida, Junichiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-08-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0879.pdf
DC.subject	Tournaments
	Cooperation
	Competition
	Multi-task problem
	Sabotage
DCTERMS.abstract	In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which diﬀerent levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of competitive environment. Among other things, we ﬁnd that: (i) an increase in individual incentives, holding the level of team incentives ﬁxed, can lower total eﬀort as it induces ineﬃcient allocation of eﬀort; (ii) the optimal level of individual incentives depends on and is complementary to the level of team incentives. The analysis illuminates the essential role of economic subgroups, such as ﬁrms, in achieving some degree of cooperation in an inherently competitive environment, and provides an explanation for why high-powered incentives are more common in market arrangements than within ﬁrms.
citation_title	Multilayered Tournaments
citation_author	Ishida, Junichiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-08-06
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	879
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	27
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25851
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0879.pdf

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