Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry

Miyaoka, Akira; Sato, Misato; Kitamura, Hiroshi

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論文情報

タイトル	Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry
著者	Miyaoka, Akira Miyaoka, Akira
	Sato, Misato Sato, Misato
	Kitamura, Hiroshi Kitamura, Hiroshi
キーワード等	Vertical Relation
	Entry Deterrence
	Relationship-Specific Investment
	Switching Costs
抄録	This study constructs a model of a relationship-specific investment in a dynamic framework. Although such investment decreases operating costs and increases the current joint profits of firms in vertical relationships, its specificity reduces the ex-post flexibility to change a trading partner in the future. We demonstrate that whether the investment contract deters entry even in the absence of exclusionary terms depends on not only the specificity but also the e ciency of the investment. We also show that an increase in the investment e ciency does not necessarily improve the equilibrium social welfare.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	13-24
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	34
刊行年月	2013-09-16
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25958
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1324.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.13-24 P.1-P.34
DC.title	Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry
DC.creator	Miyaoka, Akira
	Sato, Misato
	Kitamura, Hiroshi
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-09-16
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25958
DC.subject	Vertical Relation
	Entry Deterrence
	Relationship-Specific Investment
	Switching Costs
DCTERMS.abstract	This study constructs a model of a relationship-specific investment in a dynamic framework. Although such investment decreases operating costs and increases the current joint profits of firms in vertical relationships, its specificity reduces the ex-post flexibility to change a trading partner in the future. We demonstrate that whether the investment contract deters entry even in the absence of exclusionary terms depends on not only the specificity but also the e ciency of the investment. We also show that an increase in the investment e ciency does not necessarily improve the equilibrium social welfare.
citation_title	Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry
citation_author	Miyaoka, Akira
	Sato, Misato
	Kitamura, Hiroshi
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-09-16
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	13-24
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	34
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25958
citation_keywords	Vertical Relation
	Entry Deterrence
	Relationship-Specific Investment
	Switching Costs

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