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Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.891 P.1-P.21

Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information

Takahara, Tsuyoshi

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-12

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/26630

We analyze the rationale for offcial authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-o_ between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extracting due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the cost-reduction effort level for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the effciency of the cost-reduction effort varies by much and the healthcare payment cost is large, or if there exist many private hospitals, the insurer can improve social welfare in a wider environment.

Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information

Takahara, Tsuyoshi

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

英語

2013-12

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

891

1

21

http://hdl.handle.net/11094/26630