Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information

Takahara, Tsuyoshi

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論文情報

タイトル	Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information
著者	Takahara, Tsuyoshi Takahara, Tsuyoshi
キーワード等	Patient dumping
	healthcare payment policy
	adverse selection
抄録	We analyze the rationale for offcial authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-o_ between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extracting due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the cost-reduction effort level for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the effciency of the cost-reduction effort varies by much and the healthcare payment cost is large, or if there exist many private hospitals, the insurer can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	891
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	21
刊行年月	2013-12
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/26630
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0891.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.891 P.1-P.21
DC.title	Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information
DC.creator	Takahara, Tsuyoshi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2013-12
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/26630
DC.subject	Patient dumping
	healthcare payment policy
	adverse selection
DCTERMS.abstract	We analyze the rationale for offcial authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-o_ between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extracting due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the cost-reduction effort level for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the effciency of the cost-reduction effort varies by much and the healthcare payment cost is large, or if there exist many private hospitals, the insurer can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
citation_title	Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information
citation_author	Takahara, Tsuyoshi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2013-12
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	891
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	21
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/26630
citation_keywords	Patient dumping
	healthcare payment policy
	adverse selection

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