Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules

Krishnendu, Ghosh Dastidar

Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules

Krishnendu, Ghosh Dastidar

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2014, 902, 1-38

アクセス数:95件（2025-04-19 10:42 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/46114

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タイトル	Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules
著者	著者名 Krishnendu, Ghosh Dastidar
抄録	In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each rm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit solutions. (ii) We provide a complete characterisation of such equilibria and compare quality, price and expected scores across rst-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of the scoring rule and the distribution function of types.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	902
ページ	1-38
刊行年月	2014-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/46114
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0902.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2014, 902, p. 1-38
DC.title	Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules
DC.creator	Krishnendu, Ghosh Dastidar
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2014-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0902.pdf
DCTERMS.abstract	In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each rm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit solutions. (ii) We provide a complete characterisation of such equilibria and compare quality, price and expected scores across rst-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of the scoring rule and the distribution function of types.
DC.format	46114
citation_title	Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules
citation_author	Krishnendu, Ghosh Dastidar
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2014-06
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	902
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	38
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/46114
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0902.pdf

Scoring Auctions with Non-quasilinear Scoring Rules

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