Advertisement versus Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Takii, Katsuya

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2014, DP-2014-E-009, 1-45

アクセス数:384件（2025-10-26 00:12 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51038

論文情報

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タイトル
Advertisement versus Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium
著者
NRID
1000070346138 1000070346138
researchmap permalink
k-takii k-takii
Scopus Author ID
6603896348 6603896348
著者名
Takii, Katsuya
キーワード等
Search Theory
Incentive
Advertisement
Specific Skill
抄録
We analyze equilibrium wage contracts in a competitive search model where a firm motivates workers to invest in a match-specific skill. If skill is not critical for production, the contract is first best. If critical, the contract coincides with an efficiency wage contract and cannot attain even second best. Unlike standard efficiency wage models, the wage plays a dual role, advertisement and motivation, which induces a novel source of inefficiency: the competition to attract workers forces a wage to be chosen that increases the ex ante utility of workers at the expense of ex post utility.
出版者
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
収録物名
OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)
DP-2014-E-009
ページ
1-45
刊行年月
2014-12-26
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51038
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2014/DP2014E009.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper