Strategic Dual Sourcing as a Driver for Free Revealing of Innovation

Matsushima, Noriaki; Zhao, Laixun

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2015, 936, 1-31

アクセス数:223件（2025-08-15 22:59 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51616

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Strategic Dual Sourcing as a Driver for Free Revealing of Innovation
著者
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070261394 1000070261394
著者名
Zhao, Laixun
キーワード等
Dual sourcing
Outside option
Spillover
Vertical relations
抄録
This paper examines the role of dual sourcing (e.g., outside options) in vertical and horizontal relations. In a bilateral monopoly market, if either the upstream or downstream firm has outside options, the other firm could lose from seemingly positive shocks, e.g., market expansion or technology improvements. We extend this setting to a bilateral duopoly market in which each downstream firm has outside options and upstream firms can engage in cost reducing investments and generate technological spillovers. We find that each upstream firm has an incentive to voluntarily generate technological spillovers to its upstream rival if the downstream firms have better outside options.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
936
ページ
1-31
刊行年月
2015-05
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51616
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2015/DP0936.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers