The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private

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タイトル	The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
著者	Bhaskar, V. Bhaskar, V.
	Frechette, Guillaume R. Frechette, Guillaume R.
	Aoyagi, Masaki Aoyagi, Masaki
キーワード等	Infinitely repeated games
	monitoring
	perfect
	public
	private
	experiments
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	942
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	38
刊行年月	2015-07
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/52387
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0942.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.942 P.1-P.38
DC.title	The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
DC.creator	Bhaskar, V.
	Frechette, Guillaume R.
	Aoyagi, Masaki
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2015-07
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/52387
DC.subject	Infinitely repeated games
	monitoring
	perfect
	public
	private
	experiments
citation_title	The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
citation_author	Bhaskar, V.
	Frechette, Guillaume R.
	Aoyagi, Masaki
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2015-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	942
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	38
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/52387
citation_keywords	Infinitely repeated games
	monitoring
	perfect
	public
	private
	experiments