Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations

Matsushima, Noriaki; Shinohara, Ryusuke

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 948, 1-x

アクセス数:223件（2025-03-14 18:49 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/53873

論文情報

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タイトル
Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
著者
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000040402094 1000040402094
著者名
Shinohara, Ryusuke
キーワード等
Public good
Simultaneous bilateral bargaining
Supplier bargaining power
Nash bargaining solution
内容
September 2015. Revised August 2017.
抄録
We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the beneficiaries of the good. We find that although a pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences, the good is not necessarily provided efficiently. We show that with the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good may be produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
948
ページ
1-x
刊行年月
2017-08
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/53873
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日
2017-08