Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations

Matsushima, Noriaki; Shinohara, Ryusuke

アクセス数:189件（2024-04-25 15:22 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/53873

論文情報

タイトル	Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
著者	NRID 1000080334879 1000080334879 ORCID 0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875 researchmap permalink read0116301 read0116301 Scopus Author ID 7005645778 7005645778 著者名 Matsushima, Noriaki
著者	NRID 1000040402094 1000040402094 著者名 Shinohara, Ryusuke
キーワード等	Public good
	Simultaneous bilateral bargaining
	Supplier bargaining power
	Nash bargaining solution
内容	September 2015. Revised August 2017.
抄録	We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the beneficiaries of the good. We find that although a pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences, the good is not necessarily provided efficiently. We show that with the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good may be produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	948
ページ	1-x
刊行年月	2017-08
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/53873
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2017-08

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2017, 948, p. 1-x
DC.title	Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
DC.creator	Matsushima, Noriaki
DC.creator	Shinohara, Ryusuke
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-08
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf
DC.subject	Public good
	Simultaneous bilateral bargaining
	Supplier bargaining power
	Nash bargaining solution
DC.description	September 2015. Revised August 2017.
DCTERMS.abstract	We investigate public good provision through bilateral negotiations between a public-good supplier and the beneficiaries of the good. We find that although a pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences, the good is not necessarily provided efficiently. We show that with the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good may be produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong.
citation_title	Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations
citation_author	Matsushima, Noriaki
citation_author	Shinohara, Ryusuke
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-08
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	948
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	x
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/53873
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0948R.pdf

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