Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets

Asano, Koji

Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets

Asano, Koji

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2016, 16-12, 1-47

アクセス数:161件（2025-07-11 16:55 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583

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タイトル	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
著者	著者名 Asano, Koji
キーワード等	reputation
	risk-taking
	investor protection
	pledgeability
	investment decision
抄録	This paper presents a model of portfolio management with reputation concerns in imperfect capital markets. Managers with financial constraints raise funds from investors and select a project that is characterized by the degree of risk. Managers differ in their ability to etermine the probability of success. Based on past performance, all agents revise beliefs about managers’ ability, and the beliefs affect the availability of funds in the future. This provides motivation for managers to build reputation by manipulating their performance through project selection. We show that the quality of investor protection changes fund flows, thereby influencing managers’ project selection. Our model predicts that strong investor protection causes risk-taking behavior, whereas weak investor protection leads to risk-averse behavior.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	16-12
ページ	1-47
刊行年月	2016-05
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1612.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2016, 16-12, p. 1-47
DC.title	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
DC.creator	Asano, Koji
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-05
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1612.pdf
DC.subject	reputation
	risk-taking
	investor protection
	pledgeability
	investment decision
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper presents a model of portfolio management with reputation concerns in imperfect capital markets. Managers with financial constraints raise funds from investors and select a project that is characterized by the degree of risk. Managers differ in their ability to etermine the probability of success. Based on past performance, all agents revise beliefs about managers’ ability, and the beliefs affect the availability of funds in the future. This provides motivation for managers to build reputation by manipulating their performance through project selection. We show that the quality of investor protection changes fund flows, thereby influencing managers’ project selection. Our model predicts that strong investor protection causes risk-taking behavior, whereas weak investor protection leads to risk-averse behavior.
DC.format	56583
citation_title	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
citation_author	Asano, Koji
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-05
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	16-12
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	47
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1612.pdf

Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets

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