Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets

Asano, Koji

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論文情報

タイトル	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
著者	Asano, Koji Asano, Koji
キーワード等	reputation
	risk-taking
	investor protection
	pledgeability
	investment decision
抄録	This paper presents a model of portfolio management with reputation concerns in imperfect capital markets. Managers with financial constraints raise funds from investors and select a project that is characterized by the degree of risk. Managers differ in their ability to etermine the probability of success. Based on past performance, all agents revise beliefs about managers’ ability, and the beliefs affect the availability of funds in the future. This provides motivation for managers to build reputation by manipulating their performance through project selection. We show that the quality of investor protection changes fund flows, thereby influencing managers’ project selection. Our model predicts that strong investor protection causes risk-taking behavior, whereas weak investor protection leads to risk-averse behavior.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	16-12
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	47
刊行年月	2016-05
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1612.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.16-12 P.1-P.47
DC.title	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
DC.creator	Asano, Koji
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-05
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583
DC.subject	reputation
	risk-taking
	investor protection
	pledgeability
	investment decision
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper presents a model of portfolio management with reputation concerns in imperfect capital markets. Managers with financial constraints raise funds from investors and select a project that is characterized by the degree of risk. Managers differ in their ability to etermine the probability of success. Based on past performance, all agents revise beliefs about managers’ ability, and the beliefs affect the availability of funds in the future. This provides motivation for managers to build reputation by manipulating their performance through project selection. We show that the quality of investor protection changes fund flows, thereby influencing managers’ project selection. Our model predicts that strong investor protection causes risk-taking behavior, whereas weak investor protection leads to risk-averse behavior.
citation_title	Managerial Reputation, Risk-Taking, and Imperfect Capital Markets
citation_author	Asano, Koji
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-05
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	16-12
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	47
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/56583
citation_keywords	reputation
	risk-taking
	investor protection
	pledgeability
	investment decision

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