Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2016, 971, 1-27

アクセス数:493件（2026-02-16 10:10 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56977

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タイトル	Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
著者	NRID 1000040807450 1000040807450 著者名 Zhou, Yu
著者	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	strategy-proofness
	efficiency
	non-quasi-linearity
	minimum price rule
	common-object-ranking domain
	common-tiered-object domain
抄録	We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference pro.le. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	971
ページ	1-27
刊行年月	2016-05
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56977
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0971.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2016, 971, p. 1-27
DC.title	Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
DC.creator	Zhou, Yu
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-05
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0971.pdf
DC.subject	strategy-proofness
	efficiency
	non-quasi-linearity
	minimum price rule
	common-object-ranking domain
	common-tiered-object domain
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference pro.le. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.
DC.format	56977
citation_title	Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
citation_author	Zhou, Yu
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-05
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	971
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	27
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56977
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0971.pdf

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences : Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

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