Corporate Disclosure Policy and Product Market Competition : A Review and Discussion of Darrough (1993)

セイヒン　シジョウ　ニオケル　キギョウ　ノ　ジョウホウ　カイジ　コウドウ　Darrough　1933　ノ　レビュー　ト　コウサツ

ミワ, カズノリ

Miwa, Kazunori

呉, 重和

オウ, ジョンファ

Oh, Joong-Hwa

椎葉, 淳

シイバ, アツシ

Shiiba, Atsushi

The Economic Society of Osaka University

オオサカ　ダイガク　ケイザイ　ガッカイ

製品市場

複占

戦略的代替

戦略的補完

Voluntary Disclosure

Product Market

Duopoly

Strategic Substitutes

Strategic Complements

This paper considers the effect of product market competition on firms’ disclosure decisions. In particular, we review the pioneering work of Darrough (1993) and explain the economic intuition underlying the model. Further, we identify the key factors that determine firms’ equilibrium Disclosure policies. Darrough (1993) argues that firms’ incentives to disclose private information depend on (i) whether the firms are engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition, and (ii) whether the private information is about demand or cost. We show that in addition to whether the private information is about demand or cost, whether the information is industry-wide or firm-specific is important for firms’ disclosure incentives. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in a strict sense, firms’ Disclosure behavior is affected by whether the quantities or prices of products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements, rather than by whether they are engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition.

呉, 重和

椎葉, 淳