Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power

Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato; Kitamura, Hiroshi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2016, 978, 1-10

アクセス数:486件（2025-08-15 17:30 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57764

論文情報

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タイトル
Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power
著者
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
著者名
Sato, Misato
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
著者名
Kitamura, Hiroshi
キーワード等
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive contracts
Nash bargaining
抄録
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
978
ページ
1-10
刊行年月
2016-09-08
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57764
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0978.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers