Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts

Ishiguro, Shingo

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論文情報

タイトル	Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts
著者	Ishiguro, Shingo Ishiguro, Shingo
キーワード等	Dynamic General Equilibrium
	Insider Lending
	Implicit and Explicit Labor Contracts
	Market Lending
抄録	This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the coevolution of employment and financial systems in the process of economic development when firms’ commitment to financial and labor contracts is limited. We show that equilibrium modes of financial and labor contracts endogenously change from the informal contracting phase in which both of them are implicitly self-enforced to the formal contracting phase in which they are formally enforced and become more market-based as economies develop well. Furthermore, the formal contracting phase is irreversible in the sense that, once the economy enters that regime, it never returns back to the informal contracting phase.
公開者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
掲載誌名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻	16-25
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	63
刊行年月	2016-10-07
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/57819
関連情報 (references)	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1625.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business.16-25 P.1-P.63
DC.title	Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts
DC.creator	Ishiguro, Shingo
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-10-07
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/57819
DC.subject	Dynamic General Equilibrium
	Insider Lending
	Implicit and Explicit Labor Contracts
	Market Lending
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the coevolution of employment and financial systems in the process of economic development when firms’ commitment to financial and labor contracts is limited. We show that equilibrium modes of financial and labor contracts endogenously change from the informal contracting phase in which both of them are implicitly self-enforced to the formal contracting phase in which they are formally enforced and become more market-based as economies develop well. Furthermore, the formal contracting phase is irreversible in the sense that, once the economy enters that regime, it never returns back to the informal contracting phase.
citation_title	Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts
citation_author	Ishiguro, Shingo
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-10-07
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	16-25
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	63
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/57819
citation_keywords	Dynamic General Equilibrium
	Insider Lending
	Implicit and Explicit Labor Contracts
	Market Lending

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