The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

Matsushima, Noriaki; Yoshida, Shohei

The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

Matsushima, Noriaki; Yoshida, Shohei

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 981, 1-18

アクセス数:561件（2025-08-15 22:58 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57822

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タイトル	The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters
著者	NRID 1000080334879 1000080334879 ORCID 0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875 researchmap permalink read0116301 read0116301 Scopus Author ID 7005645778 7005645778 著者名 Matsushima, Noriaki
著者	著者名 Yoshida, Shohei
キーワード等	Countervailing power
	Buyer power
	Dominant retailer
	Two-part tariff
内容	October 2016. Revised July 2017.
抄録	We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option in uences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	981
ページ	1-18
刊行年月	2017-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57822
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0981R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2017-07

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2017, 981, p. 1-18
DC.title	The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters
DC.creator	Matsushima, Noriaki
DC.creator	Yoshida, Shohei
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0981R.pdf
DC.subject	Countervailing power
	Buyer power
	Dominant retailer
	Two-part tariff
DC.description	October 2016. Revised July 2017.
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option in uences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price.
DC.format	57822
citation_title	The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters
citation_author	Matsushima, Noriaki
citation_author	Yoshida, Shohei
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	981
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	18
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57822
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0981R.pdf

The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

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