Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach

Nishihara, Michi

Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach

Nishihara, Michi

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2016, 16-28, 1-10

アクセス数:203件（2025-03-26 13:49 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/58037

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タイトル	Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach
著者	NRID 1000020456940 1000020456940 ORCID 0000-0003-2673-1250 0000-0003-2673-1250 researchmap permalink nishiharamichi nishiharamichi Scopus Author ID 23397674300 23397674300 著者名 Nishihara, Michi
キーワード等	signaling
	real options
	asymmetric information
	acquisition
	earnout
抄録	We examine a dynamic model in which a firm chooses between selling out and going public under asymmetric information. We show that information asymmetry tends to change the firm’s policy from selling out to IPO. More precisely, a separating equilibrium can arise in which the good firm goes public while the bad firm follows the first-best sales policy because the good firm signals to market investors by doing an IPO. In order to separate itself from the bad firm, the good firm can choose an IPO timing that is earlier than the first-best IPO timing. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence that less profitable firms tend to sell out to a large firm rather than going public.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	16-28
ページ	1-10
刊行年月	2016-11
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/58037
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1628.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2016, 16-28, p. 1-10
DC.title	Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach
DC.creator	Nishihara, Michi
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-11
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1628.pdf
DC.subject	signaling
	real options
	asymmetric information
	acquisition
	earnout
DCTERMS.abstract	We examine a dynamic model in which a firm chooses between selling out and going public under asymmetric information. We show that information asymmetry tends to change the firm’s policy from selling out to IPO. More precisely, a separating equilibrium can arise in which the good firm goes public while the bad firm follows the first-best sales policy because the good firm signals to market investors by doing an IPO. In order to separate itself from the bad firm, the good firm can choose an IPO timing that is earlier than the first-best IPO timing. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence that less profitable firms tend to sell out to a large firm rather than going public.
DC.format	58037
citation_title	Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach
citation_author	Nishihara, Michi
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-11
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	16-28
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	10
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/58037
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1628.pdf

Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach

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