The Theory of Representation and Event in The Logic of Sense

イミ　ノ　ロンリガク　ニ　オケル　ヒョウショウ　ト　デキゴト　ノ　リロン

ヒラタ, キミタケ

Hirata, Kimitake

オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン ニンゲン カガク ケンキュウカ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

Sociology, Anthropology and Philosophy, Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University

出来事

実現

表現

ストア哲学

representation

event

effectuation

expression

Stoicism

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze criticizes the priority of identity and avoids the representation in order to think about the difference in itself. Nevertheless, in spite of the same intention to describe the transcendental fi eld, Deleuze, in The Logic of Sense, argues that the event is what must be represented. Here, it is certain that there is an important change in Deleuze's attitude. In this paper, we hypothesize that Deleuze, because of the introduction of the stoic dualism of bodies and incorporeals into The Logic of Sense, problematizes the incarnation of the event (the incorporeal) and the theory of representation. First, focusing on Stoicism, we describe the theory of representations, which comprehends an expression of the event and materializes the incorporeal, and then demonstrate that Deleuze needs this representation in order to the expression and the thought of the incorporeal. This attempt will reveal an aim and a limitation of The Logic of Sense.