Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality

Aoyagi, Masaki; Nishimura, Naoko; Okano, Yoshitaka

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論文情報

タイトル	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
著者	Aoyagi, Masaki Aoyagi, Masaki
	Nishimura, Naoko Nishimura, Naoko
	Okano, Yoshitaka Okano, Yoshitaka
キーワード等	heterogeneity
	equity
	efficiency
	transfer
	reciprocity
	laboratory experiments
抄録	This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient equilibrium where they earn the same payoffs. The main focus is on the comparison of two treatments with and without the ex post redistribution stage in which both players may voluntarily transfer their payoffs earned in the game to the other player. We find that (1) the transfer opportunity raises the probability of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, (2) a transfer from player 1 to player 2 is positive, and is higher when player 2 chooses the action corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, and hence (3) the transfer opportunity tends to improve the efficiency and equity of the final outcome. Furthermore, these tendencies are stronger when the two players have conflicting interests over the two equilibria than when they have common interests.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	992
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	49
刊行年月	2017-03-13
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP0992.pdf
言語	英語

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.992 P.1-P.49
DC.title	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
DC.creator	Aoyagi, Masaki
	Nishimura, Naoko
	Okano, Yoshitaka
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-03-13
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627
DC.subject	heterogeneity
	equity
	efficiency
	transfer
	reciprocity
	laboratory experiments
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient equilibrium where they earn the same payoffs. The main focus is on the comparison of two treatments with and without the ex post redistribution stage in which both players may voluntarily transfer their payoffs earned in the game to the other player. We find that (1) the transfer opportunity raises the probability of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, (2) a transfer from player 1 to player 2 is positive, and is higher when player 2 chooses the action corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, and hence (3) the transfer opportunity tends to improve the efficiency and equity of the final outcome. Furthermore, these tendencies are stronger when the two players have conflicting interests over the two equilibria than when they have common interests.
citation_title	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
citation_author	Aoyagi, Masaki
	Nishimura, Naoko
	Okano, Yoshitaka
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-03-13
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	992
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	49
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627
citation_keywords	heterogeneity
	equity
	efficiency
	transfer
	reciprocity
	laboratory experiments

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