紀要論文

紀要論文

text

国際公共政策研究. 2017, 21(2), p. 1-15

大阪大学国際公共政策学会

日本語

text

2017-03

投稿論文

Why do states that possess inhumane weapons adopt humanitarian disarmament treaties which seemingly constrain their military power? Existing works stress the impact of the international humanitarian norm or that of transnational NGOs’ activities, overlooking the central role of the military in the decision-making process regarding security issues. Therefore, in contrast to these studies, this research focuses on domestic politics and the civil-military relations in these states, proposing an alternative explanation as follows. The civilian leader (CL) decides to join a treaty when it assumes that its political benefits outweigh its military costs. Since the military costs for each state to give up a particular weapon are highly technical information that only the military actor (MA) can accurately measure, CL utilizes the advisory function of MA. However, parochial interests of MA create incentives to resist disarmament whether the target weapon is truly indispensable or not. Hence, MA fails to send a credible signal regarding the necessity of the weapon, leading to CL’s irrational acceptance of the humanitarian disarmament treaty. This implies a paradoxical situation: even though the military dominates information, it cannot effectively influence policy outcomes. I test this logic by examining Japan’s response to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

10.18910/60687

60687

非人道的兵器の国際的禁止と国内政治過程 : 日本の「クラスター弾に関する条約」参加を事例として

日高, 薫

大阪大学国際公共政策学会

日本語

2017-03

国際公共政策研究

21

2

1

15

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60687

10.18910/60687

https://doi.org/10.18910/60687