Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1001, 1-55

アクセス数:357件（2026-02-07 14:24 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274

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タイトル	Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
著者	NRID 1000050804960 1000050804960 著者名 Kazumura, Tomoya
	著者名 Mishra, Debasis
	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	multi-object allocation
	strategy-proofness
	ex-post revenue maximization
	minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism
	non-quasilinear preferences
	no wastage
	equal treatment of equals
内容	May 2017. Revised January 2020
抄録	A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for quasilinear type space, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear type spaces, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain type spaces with positive income effect.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1001
ページ	1-55
刊行年月	2020-01
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1001R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2020-01

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1001, p. 1-55
DC.title	Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
DC.creator	Kazumura, Tomoya
	Mishra, Debasis
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-01
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1001R.pdf
DC.subject	multi-object allocation
	strategy-proofness
	ex-post revenue maximization
	minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism
	non-quasilinear preferences
	no wastage
	equal treatment of equals
DC.description	May 2017. Revised January 2020
DCTERMS.abstract	A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for quasilinear type space, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear type spaces, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain type spaces with positive income effect.
DC.format	61274
citation_title	Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
citation_author	Kazumura, Tomoya
	Mishra, Debasis
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1001
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	55
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1001R.pdf

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

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