Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer

Sadakane, Hitoshi

アクセス数:128件（2024-04-20 11:40 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62145

論文情報

タイトル	Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer
著者	NRID 1000030804900 1000030804900 著者名 Sadakane, Hitoshi
キーワード等	Incomplete information
	Cheap talk
	Multistage strategic communication
	Voluntary monetary transfer
内容	June 2017. Revised June 2018. Secondary Revised January 2019.
抄録	We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the message she receives. Our results show that combining multistage information transmission with the receiver’s voluntary payments can improve welfare. Moreover, we find an upper bound of the receiver’s equilibrium payoff and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver’s equilibrium payoff. This result shows that multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer can be more beneficial for the receiver than a wide class of other communication protocols (e.g., mediation and arbitration).
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1006
ページ	1-66
刊行年月	2019-01
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62145
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1006RR.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2019-01

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2019, 1006, p. 1-66
DC.title	Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer
DC.creator	Sadakane, Hitoshi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-01
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1006RR.pdf
DC.subject	Incomplete information
	Cheap talk
	Multistage strategic communication
	Voluntary monetary transfer
DC.description	June 2017. Revised June 2018. Secondary Revised January 2019.
DCTERMS.abstract	We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the message she receives. Our results show that combining multistage information transmission with the receiver’s voluntary payments can improve welfare. Moreover, we find an upper bound of the receiver’s equilibrium payoff and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver’s equilibrium payoff. This result shows that multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer can be more beneficial for the receiver than a wide class of other communication protocols (e.g., mediation and arbitration).
citation_title	Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer
citation_author	Sadakane, Hitoshi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1006
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	66
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62145
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1006RR.pdf

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