Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

Shibata, Takashi; Nishihara, Michi

Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

Shibata, Takashi; Nishihara, Michi

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2017, 17-18, 1-27

アクセス数:436件（2026-02-17 21:04 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62185

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タイトル	Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
著者	NRID 1000070372597 1000070372597 著者名 Shibata, Takashi
著者	NRID 1000020456940 1000020456940 ORCID 0000-0003-2673-1250 0000-0003-2673-1250 researchmap permalink nishiharamichi nishiharamichi Scopus Author ID 23397674300 23397674300 著者名 Nishihara, Michi
キーワード等	bankruptcy
	adverse selection
	asymmetric information
	signaling game
	real options
	M&A
抄録	We develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes the bankruptcy choice and its timing. When the distressed firm’s shareholders sell the assets, they are better informed about the asset value than outsiders are. We show that this asymmetric information can delay the asset sales to signal asset quality to outsiders. More debt and lower asset value can reduce the signaling cost and mitigate the asset sales delay. Notably, we show that the firm changes the bankruptcy choice from selling out to liquidation bankruptcy when the signaling cost associated with selling out is high. This distortion in the bankruptcy choice greatly lowers the debt value, whereas it has a weak impact on the equity value.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	17-18
ページ	1-27
刊行年月	2017-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62185
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1718.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2017, 17-18, p. 1-27
DC.title	Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
DC.creator	Shibata, Takashi
DC.creator	Nishihara, Michi
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1718.pdf
DC.subject	bankruptcy
	adverse selection
	asymmetric information
	signaling game
	real options
	M&A
DCTERMS.abstract	We develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes the bankruptcy choice and its timing. When the distressed firm’s shareholders sell the assets, they are better informed about the asset value than outsiders are. We show that this asymmetric information can delay the asset sales to signal asset quality to outsiders. More debt and lower asset value can reduce the signaling cost and mitigate the asset sales delay. Notably, we show that the firm changes the bankruptcy choice from selling out to liquidation bankruptcy when the signaling cost associated with selling out is high. This distortion in the bankruptcy choice greatly lowers the debt value, whereas it has a weak impact on the equity value.
DC.format	62185
citation_title	Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
citation_author	Shibata, Takashi
citation_author	Nishihara, Michi
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-07
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	17-18
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	27
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/62185
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1718.pdf

Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

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