An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights

Tsuneki, Atsushi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 1010, 1-15

アクセス数:199件（2025-04-27 13:39 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67801

論文情報

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タイトル
An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights
著者
NRID
1000010207425 1000010207425
著者名
Tsuneki, Atsushi
キーワード等
volutionary Game
Property Right
Reliance Investment
Endowment Effect
抄録
We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment. We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the investment conferred by the owner but also on the reliance investment provided by the trespasser.The resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences shows that the endowment effect hardwired to the owners and trespassers depends on the difference of productivities among both parties and the density of owners within the population.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1010
ページ
1-15
刊行年月
2017-09
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67801
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1010.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers